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INTRODUCTION 
Since World War II, the international community has been holding nations accountable 
for their actions. The Nuremburg Trials set a precedent for creating mechanisms by which 
individuals and nations could be held internationally accountable for their actions. The Trials 
also recognized that many German companies were active participants in the atrocities of the war 
by doing things such as supplying the Nazis with the poisonous gas for the concentration camps.  
In 1945, the United Nations (save for its failed predecessor, the League of Nations) became the 
first international body to create binding treaties by which governments who were party had to 
abide.  Since then, its mission has been to promote and keep peace across the globe. While the 
United Nations’ (UN) success in doing so is widely debated, it is without question that since its 
formation, the UN has made a big impact in the world. One of its most prominent bodies is the 
Human Rights Council. From its creation in 1946 until 2006, it was known as the Human Rights 
Commission. Most notably, the Human Rights Commission created the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, which has been a key element in defining human rights internationally ever since. 
Furthermore, the Commission created the International Covenant on Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights ( ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), the two most prominent human rights treaties.  Along with the many other binding 
treaties the Commission and its successor, the Human Rights Council have created, the ICCPR 
and ICESCR have been remarkably successful in ensuring that states party to the treaties abide 
by their provisions.  Committees regarding each treaty have been effective in holding states 
accountable. Furthermore, the Human Rights Council mechanism of the Universal Periodic 
Review has been effective in ensuring that states are abiding by treaties to which they are party. 
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While there has been significant work done in terms of  moving states to better human 
rights practices, it has proven much more difficult to hold non-state actors in the same way.  In 
an increasingly globalized world, corporations are often the violators of human rights. As afore 
mentioned, there is precedence for holding corporations accountable for human rights violations 
internationally through the Nuremburg Tribunals. However, corporations are not states and 
therefore are not bound by the same treaties.  Moreover, companies are becoming increasingly 
transnational, making the jurisdiction of who can hold them accountable extremely questionable. 
This has made it incredibly difficult to hold transnational corporations internationally 
accountable for their violations. In 2011, John Ruggie introduced a set of Guiding Principles 
which corporations should follow in order to ensure they are adhering to high human rights 
standards.  The Human Rights Council immediately endorsed these principles; however, they do 
not have the same binding features as many other Human Rights Council instruments.  Since the 
Guiding Principles in 2011, the UN and the rest of the international community has taken 
initiative in creating mechanisms to incentivize corporations to meet these standards.  The 
Guiding Principles are founded upon the idea that it is the duty of corporations to “respect, 
protect, and remedy” human rights violations. However, because corporations do not meet before 
the Universal Periodic Review nor must they answer to a Committee on corporate human rights 
violations, there has been very little research on the extent to which non-binding principles have 
affected the practices of corporations.  Since most of these corporations are transnational,  it 
often remains in question which state has the right to hold the corporation accountable for its 
violations. Furthermore, corporations can simply move their violations to another part of the 
world where the risk of being reported for human rights violations is low. Because of  the 
transnational nature of these corporations, it makes it difficult to hold them accountable to the 
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laws of any one state nor international treaties to which states in which the practice are a party. 
Several states have mechanisms by which corporations can be held criminally liable for human 
rights violations. However this relies on the fact that the corporation’s violations are in some way 
tangential to the state litigating. There is no legal mechanism by which an international body, 
such as the UN can hold a corporation legally responsible to meeting a certain standard of human 
rights in their practices. 
There is a wide variety of guidelines and principles that companies can sign on to as a 
pledge to respect human rights in their business. The most prominent of these are the UN Global 
Compact and the Voluntary Principles.  The UN Global Compact allows for businesses to sign 
on to its Ten Principles, largely influenced by the Ruggie Principles on corporate human rights
1
.  
The UN Global Compact has been successful in terms of its membership, with over 12,000 
corporations participating
2.  This makes it world’s largest corporate responsibility initiative3.  
However, the language that the UN Global Compact uses is relatively weak, only informing 
companies on best practices and encouraging them to follow them. Similarly, the Voluntary 
Principles contain very weak language, framing themselves as a tool in order to assist companies 
in achieving their own goals of achieving higher human rights standards.  The Voluntary 
Principles are a set of principles established in 2000 in order to encourage and guide companies 
to in protecting human rights
4
. While only 21 companies have signed on to the principles, they 
have been globally recognized as a standard to which companies should hold themselves 
5
. There 
is very little literature regarding whether or not these principles, among others, have in fact 
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contributed to the betterment of human rights practices of corporations. This paper will present 
data and a case study of corporate violations in Peru since 1989 and asses how the UN Global 
Compact and the Voluntary Principles have affected corporate compliance with human rights in 
Peru.  
UN Global Compact 
 The UN Global Compact is an initiative by the United Nations by which 
corporations can sign on to 10 guiding principles that ensure a certain standard of human rights, 
labor, anti-corruption, and environment standards are met.  Corporations who sign on the UN 
Global compact then submit reports assessing how well the corporation has adhered to these ten 
principles.  The UN Global compact allows businesses to collaborate with governments and the 
United Nations in order to achieve a higher standard of human rights in business
6
. Currently, 
over 12,000 corporations are participants in the UN Global Compact
7
.  
Ruggie Principles 
The Ruggie Principles are more formally known as the Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights.  In 2005, the United Nations asked Harvard professor John Ruggie to create 
a set of guiding principles to help corporations adhere to human rights standards throughout their 
business endeavors. There principles have becomes more informally known as the “Ruggie 
Principles”.  In 2011, the Human Rights Council unanimously endorsed the Guiding Principles, 
making them an influential force in how corporations view human rights while doing business.  
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Voluntary Principles 
 The Voluntary Principles are more formally known as Voluntary Principles on Security 
and Human Rights. They were established in 2000 in order to guide companies in their business 
practices
8
. The United States and United Kingdom played an integral role in creating these 
principles
9
. 
DATASET 
 The information about Peru in this paper is gathered from the Corporations & Human 
Rights Database Project (CHRD Project). The database gives specific information on all 
corporate human rights violations which have occurred in Latin America since 1992.  This 
project is unique in its ability to provide extensive quantitative information on the number of 
allegations against corporations in Latin America.  There is yet to be any qualitative data on 
corporate compliance with human rights. This has made it difficult to track or analyze patterns in 
human rights violations. The database is intended to provide the necessary information to be able 
to make claims and analyze the reasons behind and responses to corporate human rights 
violations in Latin America. In my paper, I will be dealing specifically with the data from Peru 
and analyzing solely the patterns in one country. 
METHODOLOGY 
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  In order to create the database, we  compiled a list of allegations made by the Business 
and Human Rights Resource Centre and found the cases that occurred in Latin America. The 
Database was intended to standardize the qualitative information of each of these cases in order 
to create a uniform set of data that could  be quantitatively analyzed.  Before coding, specific 
standards were created in a CHRD Project handbook that outlined the way values should be 
coded into the database in order to create a uniform system between all members of the team. 
The data describes each of the following: Company sector, type of abuse, date of allegation, 
location of allegation, date allegation was reported, who reported the allegation,  company 
response and remedy attempts, judicial remedy attempts, state involvement and other actors 
involved. 
CASE STUDY: Buenaventura Mining Company 
Buenaventrua is Peru’s largest mining company and operate several mines within the 
country. Since 1992, there have been  14 allegations against  Buenaventura for human rights 
violations. The company joined UN Global Compact in 2004
10
.  Not only has the company joint 
UN Global Compact, but they have also sent in an annual report every year since 2006, covering 
all of the areas the report requires.  However, 9 of the 14  allegations against Buenaventura have 
happened since 2004. Moreover, 10 of those violations have been committed since 2000, when 
the Voluntary Principles came into effect and 7 have been committed since 2011, when the UN 
endorsed the Ruggie Principles  At first glance, it does not seem promising that the majority of 
Buenaventura’s allegations occur after the enactment of the Voluntary Principles and their 
joining of the UN Global Compact. It would seem as though not only does the corporation 
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continue to commit violations, but they are increasingly doing so, completely disregarding the 
guidelines to which they have committed.  However, perhaps this is an inaccurate story. The data 
then raises a new question: What exactly has the effect of new international guidelines for 
corporations been?  It is important to note that the data shows allegations of violations, not 
violations themselves.  The principles are unique in that they cannot be used to hold any of the 
companies legally accountable. They simple allow companies to pledge to meeting a certain 
standard, and thereby, advertise to the rest of the world that they have made this pledge. Since 
the principles are not enforceable, perhaps they have a different effect than would a treaty. The 
increase in violations reported does not necessarily mean there has been an increase in violations 
happening. In fact, it could very well be the case that although less violations are happening, 
more are being reported, meaning the company is becoming more transparent. While this is 
perhaps not as big of an accomplishment as threatening litigation for the companies, as some 
countries do, on an international level, it still shows progress. Transparency in the company not 
only makes the company more aware of its actions, but also allows for them to improve over 
time. It has only been 15 years since the Voluntary Principles have been in effect, 11 since the 
company joined the UN Global Compact, and 4 since the UN endorsed the Guiding Principles.  
However, this may not necessarily be the case.  An example of an earlier case (2000) in contrast 
to a later case (2012) may give insight to this. In 2000, there were two allegations of violations 
against Buenaventura. Both violations were concerning an oil spill that caused mercury to enter 
into the water supply, causing many people to get sick.  While there is no excuse for 
Buenaventura not to take responsibility for its actions, the violation can be considered to be less 
severe as it is merely an act of negligence rather than an act of intent to violate rights. In contrast, 
in 2012, after Buenaventura had signed on to the UN Global Compact and the Ruggie Principles 
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had come into effect, there was an allegation against Buenaventura regarding a far more serious 
case.  In 2012, a company personnel working in the Yanchocha mine which is run by 
Buenaventura  attacked school teachers in an elementary school for not accepting education kits 
from the company. The kits were to be given in exchange for the school’s support of the 
company, but the teachers refused. This violation is more serious in the sense that Buenaventura 
employees actively committed human rights violations. This situation was by no means 
accidental. However, the violation was committed by certain employees, not the company as a 
whole. The company immediately responded saying that it condemned the actions of the 
personnel involved in the situation. Although the violation was more severe, the company chose 
to respond.  Therefore,  perhaps the Guiding Principles cannot ensure fewer human rights 
violations, but they can  effectively guide companies into redressing violations and provide 
greater outlets for victims to bring forth allegations against companies. This, in of itself, would 
make such guidelines successful.  
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DATA ANALYSIS 
UN GLOBAL COMPACT 
 The data on corporate violations in Peru gives insight as to the effects that  the UN 
Global Compact has had on human rights allegations.  Of the 117 violations that were committed 
in the 22 year time span, the majority of companies committing violations were not UN Global 
Compact participants (figure 1).  
 
( Figure 1)  
Although at this point, there is no data on the number of companies operating in Peru that are 
participants of the UN Global compact that do not commit violations, this information is still 
insightful. The large majority of corporations committing violations are non-participants.  Only 
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21% of the companies in the dataset are members of the UN Global Compact. This may mean 
that signing on to the UN Global Compact is, in fact, effective in keeping companies form 
committing violations. In this set of cases, violations are more likely to have been committed by 
a non-member company than by a member company.  
 However, the data tells a slightly more complicated story than that.  Although there are 
more companies in the dataset who are not members than those who are non-members, 59% of 
allegations against companies were against companies who are members of the UN Global 
Compact.  Since only 21% of the companies in the database are  participants, the number of 
allegations from them is greatly disproportionate ( Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2 
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 There can be multiple explanations for this. What comes into question is what the actual 
affect is of the UN Global Compact and if this is in line with the intended effect.  The 
intended purpose of the Global Compact is to “Catalyze business action in support of UN 
goals and issues, with emphasis on collaboration and collective action” 11.  However, 
corporations that are members of the UN Global Compact and find themselves in the 
database are falling short of the vision of the Compact. There is no data on whether or not 
this is a significant percentage of companies who are participants. However, although these 
14 companies are not models of the Global Compact’s achievement of its vision, it does not 
mean that the Global Compact has not achieved anything at all. One of the main issues 
researches face when trying to measure the human rights record of corporations is that 
violations are not always reported. However, companies who are working to improve their 
human rights standards generally have mechanisms by which people can more easily hold 
allegations against the company.  It is also plausible that in Peru, like in many cases, people 
are also more likely to report violations by companies that they find will more likely change 
their behavior than those who they believe will not.  Referring to Principle 10 of the Ten 
Principles of the UN Global Compact could provide an explanation to this.  Principles 10 
states “Businesses should work against corruption in all its forms, including extortion and 
bribery
12.” While this provision does not explicitly demand that companies act in a manner 
that allows those affected by its practices speak out against their violations, it is a policy that 
requires the same amount of transparency as would lead to a greater number of their 
violations being reported.  
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 A further assessment of the data compliments this claim. Of those companies who are 
participants of the UN Global Compact , a greater number of their violations were reported 
after they became participants than before ( Figure 3).                                 
 
Figure 3 
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6 Repsol YPF 
7 Royal Dutch Shell 
8 Securitas Peru S.A. 
9 Grupo Prosegur 
10 Centrais Electricas Brasileiras, S.A. ( Electrobas) 
11 Allianz 
12 BBVA Corporate and Investment Banking 
13 HSBC 
14 Banco Santander 
 
Figure 4 
 
There seem to be two plausible explanations for the rise in the number of allegations. Firstly, 
it could be possible that companies committed more violations after joining the UN Global 
compact. However, this seems unlikely since members are obligated to turn in reports of their 
human rights record for that year.  It would make sense that companies would turn in reports that 
celebrated their progress in respecting human rights rather than violating more rights.  The 
second option then seems more likely. Since others are aware of a corporation’s dedication to 
human rights, they are more likely to make complaints against the company when rights are 
violated. The data shows that save for Ecopetrol, which has the same number of violations before 
and after signing the Global Compact, all companies had an increase in their number of 
allegations of abuses after they signed on to the Global Compact.  
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RUGGIE PRINCIPLES 
Trends among the Ruggie principles seem to be similar to those of the UN Global Compact. 
Although there is no membership to the Ruggie principles as there is to the UN Global Compact, 
It is possible to see a significant change with regards to the number of violations before and after 
the UN endorsed the guidelines (Figure 5). 
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Number of violations reported each year between 1992 to 2014 
Year 
Number 
of 
violations 
committed 
each year 
1992 2 
1993 0 
1994 3 
1995 1 
1996 2 
1997 3 
1998 5 
1999 1 
2000 5 
2001 1 
2002 3 
2003 1 
2004 2 
2005 4 
2006 11 
2007 5 
2008 1 
2009 7 
2010 6 
2011 14 
2012 7 
2013 1 
2014 1 
Figure 6 
The red circle on the graph of the number of violates reported yearly in Peru shows that 
there was a significant increase in 2011, the year the principles were enacted than in any other 
year.  This led to an increase in the average number of cases reported each year ( Figure 7). 
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Figure 7 
Figure 7 shows the number of violations committed from 1992 to 2010 and 2011 to 2014. 
62 violations happened over the 19 year period while 23 happened in the short 4 year period 
since the Ruggie Principles were enacted. The average number of violation allegations increased 
from about three a year to about 6 a year. Therefore, there is a relationship between the average 
number of  allegations reported and the year the Ruggie Principles came into play.  The possible 
explanation I used for the UN Global Compact could apply here as well. While this data makes it 
difficult to say if the number of violations went down or not because of the principles, it seems 
likely that the Ruggie principles informed and empowered people, allowing them to file more 
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complaints about violations than they did before the Ruggie Principles provided guidelines of 
what people should be expecting from corporations. The data may not be able to show if  
violation frequency lessened as a result of the Principles, but there is a definite correlation with 
the number of allegations reported and the year the Principles were enacted. This could mean 
that at some level, the Principles acted as a tool for people to hold corporations accountable. 
VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES 
 An analysis of the data shows that the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human 
Rights resembles a similar pattern to that of the Ruggie Principles. Since 2000, when the 
Voluntary Principles were enacted, there has been a steady increase in the number of violations 
reported (Figure 8).  
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Figure 8 
 As the graph shows, 17 of the violations were committed before 2000, on average 2 a 
year while 68 were committed after 2000, on average 5 a year. Here, again, there is a dramatic 
increase in violations after the Voluntary Principles were enacted. The Voluntary Principles does 
not work by membership, as only a few very large organizations are participants. Rather, it was 
intended as a set of universal guidelines for all companies to follow.  Similar to the Ruggie 
Principles, there is a correlation between when they were enacted and an increase in the number 
of violations reported. 
 Overall, there is a trend in an increase in number of  violations ( Figure 9).  
17 
68 
Average, 2.12 
Average, 4.5 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
before 2000 after 2000
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
vi
o
la
ti
o
n
s 
Number of Allegations before and after the voluntary 
principles were enacted 
20 
 
 
Figure 9 
 
Figure 9 shows the number of violations reported each year since 1992. As the graph 
shows, there has been some fluctuation over the years of the number of  violations reported. 
However, the black line on the graph is the line of regression in the cases. This line shows that, 
despite the variation, there is a strong trend towards an increasing number of violations being 
reported over time. 
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CONCLUSION 
 No definitive conclusions can be made from the data regarding a causal relationship 
between patterns in the data and the principles mentioned in this report. However, there is strong 
evidence for a correlation. While more research and data would be necessary to make this claim, 
it appears that  these principles create an environment that makes it easier to hold corporations 
accountable for their actions. This is beneficial in that the more corporations are held 
accountable for their violations, the less violations they will be likely to commit as time passes 
on. 
 This research is significant as it gives quantitative insight to the trends marking 
allegations of corporate violations in Peru.  Corporate complicity with human rights is often 
difficult to measure, making it difficult to assess the effectiveness of attempts to encourage 
corporations to meet a certain standard. I hope that this research will pave way for further 
research in being able to make statistical claims of the effectiveness of  certain guidelines and 
principles regarding corporate complicity in human rights. 
 This research is intended to be preliminary and guide future research on the topic. 
Therefore, there are limitations on this research that must be acknowledged. Primarily the dataset 
used for this project only contained 117 cases. Such a small case number makes it difficult to 
create any sufficient statistical analysis.  Furthermore, the cases in this report are solely 
concerning Peru. While it may be hypothesized that other states will project similar trends, this 
information cannot be properly extrapolated to other states without further research. Moreover, 
the nature of the data is limited in that is only accounts for known violations. This means that 
these violations are reported. Several other violations occur that may not be reported and 
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therefore are not included in the dataset. This is discussed extensively throughout the report. The 
data shown here and the analysis can only point to correlate relationships, they cannot prove 
causation. Lastly, there are many different factors in each violation that cannot be quantified and 
therefore can never be adequately reflected in a dataset. This makes it possible to infer as to 
causes why certain trends occur, but impossible  to ever make definitive claims regarding these 
variables that cannot be quantified. 
 Future research on this subject will use a large dataset that includes all cases coded in the 
CHRD Project database. This will include all violations throughout Latin America within the 
same time period.  Having a larger database will allow for greater statistical analysis, making it 
possible to make larger claims on the relationships between reports of violations and 
international principles that  may affect these trends.  Further research will also include a much 
more extensive number of international principles and guidelines corporations have signed on to. 
A larger number of these will allow for distinctions to be made of the consequences of certain 
principles based on how obligatory they are. It will also allow for an assessment of if the number 
or types of principles a corporation signs on to makes a difference in their violations record. 
Furthermore, the dataset has the capability of allowing for an analysis if certain types of 
violations are more or less likely based on certain principles, if judicial remedies or corporate 
remedies are more or less likely to be taken, and if corporations are more likely to respond to 
allegations based upon which principles they have signed on to. 
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